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THE IMMIGRATION ACT AND RETURNING
RESIDENT ALIENS.
Prior to the Act of March 3rd, 19o3, the right of aliens, who
had taken up their residence in the United States, to return from a
visit abroad without being subjected to the operation of the immigration acts in force, although on several occasions seriously
challenged by the immigration authorities, had been almost uniformly affirmed by the United States courts before whom the
question had been brought for adjudication. Changes of phraseology in the Act of March 3rd, 19o3, followed il corresponding
sections of the present Act of ,February 2oth, 19o7, caused the
question to be again presented for judicial determination, with
the result that the decisions rendered since 19o3 have been far
from uniform.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the general result of
judicial opinion on this point, both before and after the Act of
March 3rd, 19o3, or of the immigration acts in force before and
after that date, attention is drawn to the well known and generally accepted principle of international law which provides that, in
the absence of municipal legislation restricting or denying the
application of the principle in question, aliens who are permitted
by a sovereign State to acquire a domicile within its territorial
jurisdiction are, generally speaking, entitled to all the rights and
subject to all the obligations which the citizens of the State, in
their residential capacity, enjoy or assume.
(359)
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The foreigner coming to the United States with the purpose
of settling in this country-of making it his home-in other
words, the alien immigrant, whether he comes as a steerage passenger or as the occupant of a suite de luxe on one of the great
Transatlantic liners-would stand, therefore, were this international principle the sole criterion by which his rights as a resident
are to be determined, in the position of any resident citizen of the
United States, except in so far as rights or obligations arising
from the citizenship status are concerned. It is, however, an
equally well settled maxim of the law of nations that the rights
and obligations of resident aliens flowing from the mere fact
of domicile as such, exist subject to any condition or restriction
which the municipal law of the sovereign may impose.
Congress has the undoubted right to prohibit the entrance
into this country of any and all aliens; or, having admitted them,
to expel those already admitted, or to prohibit or conditionally
permit the re-entrance into the United States of aliens who have
already acquired a domicile here. This power is as necessary an
attribute of national sovereignty as that of exercising any other
act tending toward national self-preservation. Needless to say,
the exigency calling for the exercise of this power of general exclusion has never yet arisen, and, in any case would, to say the
least, be of doubtful vindication; for, as Hall says, for a State to
exclude all foreigners would be to withdraw from the brotherhood of civilized peoples.' On the contrary, the avowed policy
of this country has been, from the time it became a sovereign
State, to stand with its ports open to social and commercial intercourse between its citizens and the nationals of its sister
powers. The very act of assuming such a position constitutes
in itself an implied guarantee that those aliens who avail themselves of the opportunity to enter shall have the right to claim the
privileges and advantages which the law of this country affords
its residents, except of course such as flow directly from the fact
of citizenship itself.
"Foreigners," says Sir Robert Phillimore, "whom a State
has once admitted unconditionally into its territories," (or, it may
*Hall, International Law, 4th Ed., page 22 3.
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be added, who have faithfully fulfilled the conditions precedent
to admission) "are entitled not only to freedom from injury, but
to the execution of justice in respect to their transactions with
subjects of that State. No country has a right to set, as it were,
a snare for foreigners; therefore conditions hostile to their interests, or different from general usage, must be specified beforehand."

'2

"By general international law" says the late Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, "foreigners who have become domiciled in
a country other than their own acquire rights and must discharge
duties in many respects the same as those possessed by and imposed upon the citizens of that country, and no restriction on the
footing upon which such persons stand by reason of their domicile of choice is to be presumed."3
Nevertheless, rights claimed by resident aliens based on this
principle alone may be seriously modified by provisions of municipal law which the country of domicile may deem it necessary
to adopt and enforce; and, up to a certain point, it must be the only
judge of its own necessities. - If, to again cite Hall, "a country
decides that certain classes of foreigners are dangerous to its
tranquillity, or are inconvenient to it socially or economically or
morally, and if it passes general laws forbidding the access of
such persons, its conduct affords no ground for complaint. Its
fears may be idle; its legislation may be harsh; but its action is
equal." 4 But it is only just that the municipal laws, providing the
conditions of entry, should so state them, either directly or by
plain implication, that those on whom they are designed to
operate shall at least have the opportunity of being cognizant of
the conditions under which they may enter into and reside in the
country of their prospective domicile.
In endeavoring, then, to determine the rights of resident
aliens with reference to the present' Act, the question is not
whether or not Congress has the power to impose conditions
under which they may retain an already established domicile,
but whether or not Congress has, in fact, exercised this power.
'Phllimore on Inter. Law, VoL II, chapter :z
'au Au Bew v. United States, x44 U. S. 47.
'Hall, ,id, page 223.
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The decision in the Lau Au Bew case (supra page 361) makes
it clear that any restriction of the right of the resident alien,
dwelling in the United States, to retain his domicile-and to retain
means necessarily the right to return to it after a temporary absence undertaken animo revertendi-is not to be presumed. Unless, therefore, the present Act contains provisions from which it,
expressly or by necessary implication, appears that it was the
intention of Congress to restrict the resident alien in or to deprive
him of his domiciliary rights, it is hard to see how the general
provisions relative to the admission, exclusion or deportation of
aliens can, broadly speaking, be deemed to apply to those of the
special class mentioned.
As stated by the Court in the case of United States v. Nakashima, (16o Fed. 843, C. C. A., 9th Circuit,) "the act of i891 had
uniformly been held to apply solely to alien immigrants, and not to
affect the rights of resident aliens." The fact that the judge, who
rendered the opinions in two of the cases most frequently cited
to this effect, was the first to enunciate the new doctrine which
arose with the enactment of the Act of March 3rd, i9o3, namely
that the substitution of the word "aliens" in that act for "alien
immigrants" in certain sections of prior acts included in its operation all aliens (Taylor v. United States; 152 Fed. i, and ez-parte
Hoffman 179 Fed. 839) gives his decisions under the prior
acts a peculiar interest. In Martorelli's case, (63 Fed. 437)
he said, in construing the act of 1891 and those preceding it:
"These acts refer to aliens who are imported into or who immigrate to this country, not to persons already resident here, who
temporarily depart and return;" and in re Maiola, (67 Fed.
114): "The entire body of statute law touching the exclusion
of contract laborers conclusively shows that it is directed exclusively against alien immigrants, not against alien residents
when returning after a temporary absence," etc.
In the Taylor case, supra, the same Court said, in construing the Act of March 3rd, 1903: "The word 'alien' is a
broad one with a definition wholly unambiguous and clearly understood by all, lawyers and laymen alike, * * * 'alien immigrant'
is a less comprehensive term than 'alien,' and when it is deliberately discarded for the broader term the change is highly signifi-

RETURNING RESIDENT ALIENS

cant." Of what small significance the Supreme Court thought
this change appears in the opinion which reversed the Taylor
case on appeal, (207 U. S. i2o), where the Court remarked,

"We can see no reason to suppose that the omission meant to do
more than to avoid the suggestion that no one was within the
act who did not come here with the intent to remain," and held
that the term "alien" as used in the section of the act, subject to
its consideration on the issues before it, did not include alien
seamen on ordinary shore leave. But to say that the act affected
aliens other than immigrants is far from saying that it affected
all aliens, including resident aliens returning from a temporary
absence abroad. The Supreme Court's decision seems to be
limited to holding first, that the word "aliens," as used in the Act
of 19o3, did not include all aliens; and, second, that the omission
of the word "immigrants" might have this significance and no
more: that it extended the operation of the Act to aliens other
than those who might come to the United States for the purpose
of making it their home.
Nevertheless, the Federal courts have in various instances
refused to interfere in behalf of aliens held for deportation under
the act, although the fact of prior residence in this country was
undisputed. The doctrine originating in the Taylor case, having
been demolished on appeal, could no longer serve as a safe precedent for subsequent decisions; and it is interesting to note how
far the courts fall short of passing on the broad question as to
whether or not the present act or that of 1903 applies to aliens
resident in the United States. It may be stated in this connection
that the word "immigrants" is omitted in the present act in the
sections corresponding to those of the Act of 1903-the same
omission which led to the Taylor doctrine; but it is to be observed
that these sections deal with the obligations of shipowners or
transportation companies "bringing" or "landing" aliens in the
United States, and have nothing to do with the designation of
what classes of aliens are to be excluded or with the instrumentalities by which such exclusion is to be effected.
In the case of United States v. Watchorn, (164 Fed. 152)
decided under the present act, admission was refused an alien by
the Board of Special Inquiry established thereunder on the ground
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that the act of stabbing another person, of which the petitioner
had been convicted while abroad, involved moral turpitude, and
under section 2 constituted a justifiable ground of exclusion. The
applicant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to issue, alleging
as a specific ground that the act did not apply to an alien previously admitted to the United States, and relied upon rule 4 of the
Immigration Rules to the effect that "the provisions of the immigration act do not apply to aliens who have once been admitted
to the United States or any waters, territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, proceeding to or from the continental territory of the United States, except aliens coming from
the Canal Zone and except Japanese or Korean laborers coming
from Hawaii with passports limited to Hawaii, Mexico or Canada." The Court held this rule to apply to aliens proceeding
either from the dependencies to the continent, or vice versa, and
concluded that "this provision does not apply to the petitioner,
who arrived from a foreign country, and not from a dependency."
The ground of the petition was that the petitioner belonged to a
particular class of resident aliens not subject to the provisions of
the act. The Court found that the alien did not belong to such
class, and accordingly dismissed the writ. Moreover, the Board
of Special Inquiry had found the petitioner to be a convict and
excludable on that ground. With this finding the Court did not
attempt to interfere. The broad question as to whether or not
prior residence in the United States by an alien relieved him from
the operation of the statute does not appear to have been presented, as the extract from the petition quoted by the Court indicates that the petitioner relied, for his right to enter, on a departmental rule his version df which the Court did not accept.
In the case of ex parte Crawford (165 Fed. 830) the Court
held that the relator's prior domicile conferred no rights on her,
and denied her petition. This case is apparently that of an aliei
woman domiciled in the United States, who left the country
temporarily intending to r~turn, and who, on her return, was allowed to enter, but "for some months after her arrival conducted
herself badly," and still later "apparently lived respectably." The
inference is that after her arrival she lived for a while, at least,
an immoral life. This case goes, then, no further than to decide
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that under theprovisions of the present act an alien woman who has
returned to the United States for immoral purposes cannot claim
immunity from the operation of the act on the ground of prior
domicile in this country; the exact conclusion reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Hoffman case. (Supra, page 362.)
In the case of ex parte Petterson (166 Fed. 536) the petitioner claimed to be entitled to her discharge on habeas corpus on
the ground that an alien who has in good faith acquired a residence in the United States may, upon his return after a temporary absence in a foreign country, enter without molestation
by our immigration officers. The Court was apparently strongly
inclined to base its refusal of the writ on the Taylor doctrine,
but, waiving that ground, declined to interfere for what appeared to it to be a better reason, saying: "I am strongly inclined to the opinion that the petitioner in the case at bar, even if
she had acquired a domicile in the United States prior to her
voluntarily leaving the country must be held to be within the
prohibition of the Immigration Law of February 2oth, 19o7, it
being conceded that she was a prostitute at the time of her reentry, and was found practising prostitution within three years
after such re-entry." The Court then proceeds to show that in
its opinion the petitioner never had acquired a domicile in the
United States, and closes with these words: "I therefore hold
that the evidence contained in the record was of such a nature as
to justify the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor in
finding * * * that the petitioner did not belong to that class of
aliens which, by reason of their having acquired a domicile in this
country, should be permitted to return unaffected by our immigration laws."
The case of the United States v. Hook, (i66 Fed. ioo7)
presents the identical question raised by the Petterson case, the
Court's view being that "even a person who had been in the
United States living a correct life, who then returns to the country of her nativity and citizenship, and then afterwards re-enters
the United States for an immoral purpose, seems to me to be
clearly within the mischief against which the provisions of the
law in question" (the present act) "were directed."
In the case of the United States v. Villet (i73 Fed. 500) the
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Court held that "the result of these cases" (those above cited)
"is, that at least in the case of the importation of women for immoral purposes, the fact that they have resided in this country
for a certain period and have then gone abroad does not prevent
the operation of the act, in the case of persons who import them
back into this country for immoral purposes." The Court further cites in support of its decision the two cases of in re Moses
(83 Fed. 995) and in re Kleibs (128 Fed. 656). But the Moses
case did not involve the question of the right of a domiciled
alien to return, but that of the wife and children of an alien domiciled in the United States without having acquired citizenship
to join him in this country; whereas it appears from the brief
decision in the Kleibs case that- the alien seeking to return was
one of those whose entry into the United States was prohibited,
and who had, therefore, never acquired a lawful domicile in this
country.
Finally in the case of ex parte Hoffman (supra p. 362) the
question was whether or not an alien woman who, after her first
entrance into the United States, had regularly engaged in the
practice of prostitution was, after leaving this country and reentering it to take up her old occupation, subject to the operation
of the present act. The Court denied the petition for the writ
presented on her behalf; but apparently considered that the only
point before it was "the single question * * * whether the provisions of the Act of 19o7 apply to an alien who, after original
entry into this country, has remained here more than three years,
and then, after a brief absence abroad, again seeks to enter the
United States."
It is, however, to be noted that neither in the Hoffman case
nor in any one of the six cases which precede it in the present discussion has the "single question" as to whether or not an alien
domiciled in this country who returns thereto after a temporary
absence animo revertendi is subject to the provisions of the immigration act been presented or decided. In the Crawford, Petterson, Hook, Villet and Hoffman cases the true question was
whether or not the act is operative as to alien prostitutes with a
prior residence in this country; in the Watchorn case as to
whether or not it applies to alien convicts; in the Kleibs case
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whether the .prior act covered the case of an alien who had not
acquired a lawful domicile; and in the Moses case as to whether
it was applicable to aliens who had never acquired any domicile
whatsoever.
The cases of Rodgers v. the United States (152 Fed. 346)
and the United States v. Nakashima (i6o Fed. 844) are the leading authorities in support of the view that the Act of 1903 was
not applicable to returning aliens lawfully domiciled in the United
States.
The Rodgers case, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, was appealed from the Pennsylvania District
Court, which held that the petitioner was not an immigrant in
the sense of the Act of 1903, and that, after an alien has once
become domiciled, he is entitled to the same liberty of movement
enjoyed by residents and citizens alike; and until he abandons his
residence he is no longer amenable to the excluding provisions
of the immigration law. On appeal the Court was "clearly of
the opinion that an alien who has acquired a domicile in the
United States cannot thereafter, and while still retaining such
domicile, be legally treated as an immigrant on his return to this
country after a temporary absence for a specific purpose not involving change of domicile."
The Nakashima case, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, presents a similar state of facts, namely
the case of a resident alien who, on return to the United States,
was barred under the Act df 1903 on the finding by the Board of
Special Inquiry that he was afflicted with a darigerous contagious
disease; and, following the Rodgers case, lays stress on the fact
that aliens resident in the United States acquire rights by virtue
of such residence of which they are not deprived by a temporary
absence from the country. On this point the Court states that
"aliens have always been allowed to reside in the United States
and acquire property there * * * and their right to return to
the United States, after having temporarily left the same with
intention to return, has always been recognized. It is not to be
presumed that Congress intended to change the whole trend of its
prior legislation in regard to alien residents, construed as that
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legislation has been by the Courts, without expressing that intention in terms so clear as to leave no room for doubt."
In marshalling the foregoing decisions for the purpose of
comparison, the opposing views taken may be summed up as
follows: In the Taylor case and in those which purport to adopt
its doctrine that the omission of the word "immigrants" in
the acts of 1903 and 19o7 necessarily means that the term

"aliens" means "all aliens", including those domiciled in this
country, though it must be admitted that in the Hook and Villet
cases the Court shows a disposition to limit this interpretation to
the case of alien prostitutes; in the Rodgers and Nakashima cases
the contention first, that the omission of the term "immigrants"
does not give the term "aliens" the broad meaning attributed
to it by opposing decisions, and second, that the rights of domicile
acquired by resident aliens cannot, under the provisions of the
act, be deemed subject to restriction or abrogation by mere temporary absence.
It must be borne in mind that the Taylor case was decided
under the Act of 19o3; and the Watchorn and following cases
under that of 1907; and that, in so far as the latter may be said
to follow the doctrine originating in the Taylor case, the Courts
seem to have taken it for granted that it is equally applicable to the
present act. An examination of section 25 of the latter would
seem, however, to show that in assuming that this doctrine applies to both acts the Courts have overlooked a most significant
change in the Act of 1907.

Section 24 of the Act of 19o3 provides for the appointment
of immigration officers with power to admit aliens; but that every
alien who may not appear to the examining inspector to be clearly
and without a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for examination in relation thereto by a Board of Special Inquiry. Section
25 provides "that Boards of Special Inquiry shall be appointed
by the commissioners of immigration at the various ports of
arrival as may be necessary for the prompt determination of all
cases of aliens detained at such ports under the provisions of law."
In the present act section 24 is repeated, and section 25 likewise, except that in the latter the term "aliens" is set aside, and
the term "immigrants" is substituted therefor,
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That this change was deliberate and not the result of inadvertence is shown by the history of the bill from its presentation
to its passage. As introduced by Senator Dillingham to the Senate on February I4th, 19o6, section 25 contains the word "immi-

grants." On that date it was read and referred to the Committee
on Immigration. On March 29th it was reported with amendments with the word "immigrants" stricken out, and "aliens"
substituted. In this shape it passed the Senate on May 23rd, 19o6.
On May 24th it was referred in the House to the Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, and on the 29th reported with
an amendment and committed to the Committee of the whole
House on the state of the Union, and ordered printed with the
word "aliens" stricken out and "immigrants" again in its place.
On June 3oth it was again ordered printed as amended by the
House, and submitted to conference. On its return from conference the word "immigrants" was retained.
It is significant that during the period of time extending
from the date of the presentation of the bill until its passage the
following cases, touching directly on the point as to whether or
not the Act of 1903 operated on all aliens, were decided in the
Federal courts: The Aultman case, (143 Fed. 922, Feb. I 9 th
19o6) where the act was held not to apply to a resident alien on
his return from a temporary absence in Canada; the Buchsbaum
case (141 Fed. 221, Dec. 12th, 1905), to the same effect; the
Rodgers case, (152 Fed. 346, Feb. 13th, 19o7), sustaining the

Buchsbaum decision on appeal; and the Taylor case (152 Fed. x,
Jan. 16th, 19o7), which held flatly that the act applied to all aliens.
Thus the question of whether or not the Act of 19o3 applied
to resident aliens came squarely up for judicial determination at
a date preceding that on which the bill was presented, and Congress must therefore have been cognizant of this fact; and it does
not seem unreasonable to conclude that the change in the present
act was the result of the intention to remove any doubt which had
arisen by reason of the omission of the term "immigrants" from
the act then in force, particularly in view of the long established
and hitherto uniformly accepted doctrine that the immigration
acts did not apply to foreigners who had acquired a domicile in
this country. The least that can be said, however, with regard to
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the significance of this change is that whatever ground may have
been deemed sufficient to justify the view that the Act of 19o3
applied to all aliens, based as it was on the sole circumstance of the
absence of the term "immigrants" in that act, must necessarily
have no further be'aring in the face of the deliberate substitution
of terms in the present act, and particularly where that substitution occurs in the section defining the jurisdiction of the only instrumentality vested with power to exclude in the first instance.
It seems, then, that, shorn of whatever significance may have
been supposed to result from the absence of the term "immigrants," the present act must be classified with those antedating
19o3, uniformly held by the Courts not to apply to domiciled
aliens, unless it contains additional provisions which indicate
clearly that prior domicile shall not be a bar to its operation.
Section 21 provides that aliens found within three years
after entry to be unlawfully in the United States are subject to
deportation under the act. Unlawful presence in such cases must
be either the result of unlawful entry in the first place, or of acts
done by the alien subsequent to a lawful entry, which make the
presence of the alien in the country unlawful. The only condition imposed by the act on the right to acquire a lawful residence
is the fact of lawful entry; and if the rights acquired by such
domicile are subject to restriction or abrogation in specified cases,
this must appear plainly from the provisions of the act itself.
Since section 2 provides that disqualified aliens can never
enter lawfully, it follows that they can never acquire a lawful
domicile on which the claim to retain the right to re-enter can
be predicated. Further, the present act places a restriction on the
rights ensuing from domicile even after lawful entry with regard
to certain designated classes of aliens-prostitutes and persons
connected with houses of prostitution-for, under section 3, as
amended by the Act of March 26th, i9io, persons who become
members of the objectionable classes specified therein can, at any
time ifter entry, be deported. This amounts to a specific declaration on the part of Congress that, notwithstanding that they
have obtained a lawful residence in this country, such aliens are
subject to expulsion, and the plea of domicile cannot avail themthat, even after lawful entry, aliens who fall beneath the ban of
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section 3 forfeit their right to retain their domicile in the United
States.
In these instances only does the statute provide that rights
inherent in domicile lawfully acquired are, under its provisions,
subject to abrogation; and to this extent only does the municipal
law curtail domiciliary rights which, in the absence of municipal
enactment, international law presumes.
It seems hardly worth while to comment on the question of a
supposed right to re-enter based on a former residence unlawfully
acquired, and undetected by the immigration authorities except
to state that, no lawful domicile ever having been acquired in
such cases, there is no domicile to resume. Again, with regard to
persons subject to deportation under section 3 who, after a blameless residence in this country, are found on return from abroad
to have assumed the objectionable status during their absence,
the claim of right to re-enter based on prior lawful residence
would be equally unfounded; for the section provides that by the
mere fact of assuming that status the right to further residence
in this country is forfeited.
The result of section 2 may be said in this connection to
prohibit the acquisition of domicile by all disqualified aliens mentioned therein; of section 3, to prohibit the retention of domicile
by those aliens only who, after lawful entry, assume the objectionable pursuits specifically set out; and the result of both in all
other respects, construed together with section 21, to leave all
rights flowing from lawful domicile intact in the case of aliens
who have fulfilled the one condition df lawful entry.
The position of the alien who, acting in good faith, has established his right to land in the United States is that he has fulfilled the one condition necessary to the acquisition of domicile
imposed upon him by the immigration act. As the result of fulfilling this condition he is qualified to retain his domicile in this
country, and as long as he does not forfeit his right of retention
in the way or ways designated by the act, he remains in full possession of all the rights accruing to lawful domicile guaranteed
him by the law of nations. His domiciliary rights might have
been expressly made subject to abrogation as were those of the
resident alien prostitute; but the fact remains that the act con-
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tains no provisions to that effect. However physically or mentally stricken while lawfully an actual resident of this country,
such a person is not liable to expulsion; and it seems no more -than
fair to assume that where Congress would not expel it would
not exclude, particularly where, as in the Rodgers and Nakashima
cases, the sufferer is a victim of a misfortune which he can neither
foresee nor prevent. If it is urged that, by admitting the returning alien under such conditions, citizens of this country with
whom he must necessarily come into contact are liable to incur
those injurious results from which it was the very purpose of the
immigration acts to shield them, it may be said, apart from the
fact that the provisions of the present act do not seem to have
been constructed to meet the specific case, that when the alien is
allowed to enter in the first instance, he is admitted as a human
being, subject to human infirmities, moral, mental or physical.
The risk of contagion to which the people of the United States
may be subjected as the result of his being permitted to live
among them and associate with them, and exercise his domiciliary
rights in the natural and proper course of his relations with them.
is one which Congress, by the fact of permitting him to enter as
an immigrant, voluntarily assumes; and to impute to Congress
the intention or desire to exclude such a resident on returning
from a trip abroad, during which he has been unfortunate enough
to contract a disease, mental or physical, which would bar his
admission if coming as an immigrant, would seem not less unreasonable than to suggest that he should be subject to expulsion
because unlucky enough to become similarly afflicted while physically residing in the United States.
Clement L. Bouvi.
Washington, D. C.

